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Philosophers have long considered man's "awareness of his own 
awareness" to be a characteristic unique to mankind. It has been specu-
lated that this reflective ability separates man from the animals. 
While animals show awareness of their present states, and indeed past 
states through their behaviors, it is thought that they have no cogni-
tion of this awareness or of their memory. 
Besides the representations so far considered, namely those 
which according to their construction could be referred to 
time, space, and matter, if we see them.with reference to the 
object, or to pure sensibility and understanding [i.e., 
knowledge of causality] if we see them with reference to the 
subject, yet another faculty of knowledge has appeared in man 
alone of all the inhabitants of the earth; an entirely new 
consciousness has arisen, which with very appropriate and 
significant accuracy is called reflection. For it is in fact 
a reflected appearance, a thing derived from this knowledge 
of perception, yet it has assumed a fundamentally different 
nature and character. It is not acquainted with the forms 
of perception, and in its regard even the principle of suf-
ficient reason, which rules over every object, has an entirely 
different form. It is only this new consciousness at a higher 
potential, this abstract reflex of everything intuitive in the 
non-perceptual conception of reason, that endows man with that 
thoughtfulness which so completely distinguishes his con-
sciousness from that of the animal, and through which his 
whole behavior on earth turns out so differently from that of 
his irrational brothers (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 36). 
Frequently within science such intriguing ideas preclude experi-
mental investigation. This occurs because such phenomena are almost 
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inevitably complex, and are therefore difficult to operationally relegate 
to a laboratory setting. The domain of scientific research is restricted 
by the methodologies available for making accurate measurement. Utiliza-
tion of the scientific method requires public and replicable observa-
tions, thus constraining areas of research to those amenable to such 
procedures. 
The problem seems more pronounced in the science of psychology in 
behavior is used as the data base. Disagreement exists as to the de-
lineation of which areas should be included within this behavioral 
domain. In the behaviorist framework of psychology objective measures 
of overt behavior are sought. Radical behaviorists disparage any at-
tempt to deal with subjective or internal states, interpreting these as 
suspect remnants of introspectionism. Yet because of the nature of 
psychology, stringent adherence to overt behavior may not be the most 
prudent or productive method for the advancement of psychological 
knowledge. Behaviorism ignores an important realm of available data 
concerning the complementary subjective behaviors that are occurring. 
Recent trends in cognitive psychology take issue with the rigid behav-
ioristic approach. Neisser (1967), for example, contends that psychol-
ogy is essentially concerned with the mind and its processes, not merely 
with behavior. Psychology employs behavior as the necessary means to 
gain access to the workings of the mind. This viewpoint supports active 
processing and transformation of information within the individual. 
With the development of psychology sophisticated and intricate methodol-
ogies have evolved to measure complex subjective experience. These 
allow for quantification of conscious private experience. 
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Signal Detection Theory 
Recent methodological developments in signal detection theory have 
provided impetus for measures of processes such as "awareness of aware-
ness" (Murdock, 1966). Signal detection theory originated in electrical 
engineering work with detection problems in radar, and was soon applied 
to the more general area of psychophysics and perception as an alter-
native to threshold measures of sensation (Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 
1961). Threshold theory states that there is a sensory threshold, 
above which sensation is experienced, and below which the subject would 
simply guess. To accommodate for guessing, the traditional "correction 
for guessing" was utilized (Kinsch, 1970). Yet experimental studies 
indicated threshold measures were unreliable, both between and within 
subjects (Swets, 1964). 
Threshold measures ignored the fact that our subjective experience 
is not a direct reflection of reality or of the stimulus input to the 
sensory receptors; more than sensory information must be involved. 
Signal detection theorists postulated that psychological information 
processing must exist in addition to the sensory processing. The idea 
of background interference or "noise" seemed to augment the necessity 
of processing other than sensory, especially when considered in light 
of the physiological findings of spontaneous neural activity: 
Imagine some neural pulses arriving at the brain; are they 
due to light entering the eye, or are they merely spontaneous 
'noise' in the system? The brain's problem is to 'decide' 
whether neural activity is representing outside events, or 
whether it is mere 'noise' which should be ignored (Gregory, 
1973, p. 81). 
Psychophysicists hypothesize an active decision-making process in 
addition to the sensory process which detennines if the individual will 
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respond to the sensation. To experimentally separate these two compo-
nents, that is, to obtain independent measures of sensitivity and 
decision processes, signal detection methods were adapted. 
In signal detection theory, two different but overlapping distri-
butions are assumed to exist: one for random noise (N), and one for 
signal-plus-noise (S+N), with the mean of the signal-plus-noise dis-
tribution having the higher value (see Figure 1). These distributions 
are usually depicted as normal, and as having equal variances. The 
abscissa represents the value or strength of an observation, which is 
the sensory data on which the decision is based. The ordinate displays 
the probability of the observational value occurring within each of the 
probability density distribution functions. Signal detection theory 
provides a measure of sensitivity which is uncontaminated by response 
bias or decision factors, and which varies along a single continuum. 






Figure 1. Hypothesized Distributions of Signal 
Detection Theory 
For observational values where the distributions overlap, perfect 
discrimination is impossible. The subject must decide between the two 
distributions. For this decision process, the subject adopts a 
criterion, S, which is essentially a cutoff point on the observational 
scale. For values above the criterion the subject reports experiencing 
a signal, and below the criterion reports no signal. Thus, assuming 
there is some overlap in the two underlying distributions, there are 
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four interdependent conditional probabilities which can be obtained from 
this binary decision process. They are: the hit rate {HR= P(S+NIS+N)}, 
the false alarm rate {FAR= P(S+NIN)}, and their complements, the miss 
rate {MR= P(NIS+N)}, and the correct rejection rate {CRR = P(N!N)}. 
The relationship between the hit rate and false alarm rate is depicted 
in the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. 
The signal detection view sounds deceptively similar to threshold 
theory. In signal detection theory, however, the criterion is set by 
the subject, and is not a function of sensory processes, but depends on 
motives, values, and expectations regarding noise and signal-plus-noise 
events (Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961). The criterion describes a 
response or decision threshold rather than a sensory threshold; in 
signal detection theory sensation is represented by a continuous proc-
ess. Signal detection theory and threshold theory also differ in the 
shapes assumed for the noise and signal-plus-noise distributions. In 
threshold theory the distributions are traditionally rectangular, thus 
all values occur with equal frequency. 
Rectangular distributions are certainly atypical in psychology, 
and it appears counterintuitive that extreme and mean observational 
values would occur with equal frequency. Nonetheless, because signal 
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detection theory hypothesizes a sensory continuum instead of two discrete 
states, these different distributions make testable predictions. 
According to threshold theory, the relationship between the hit 
rate and false alarm rate should increase linearly as the subject moves 
his criterion along the observational axis. Signal detection theory 
predicts that as the subject moves the criterion from right to left the 
rate of change will first be greater for the hit rate, and then greater 
for the false alarm rate, producing a smoothly arched ROC curve. 
Prior to the work of Egan, Shulman and Greenberg (1959), the exper-
imental manipulation of the criterion required many experiments under 
varying conditions of payoff or instructions, each of which produced 
one point on the ROC curve. Egan et al. developed the now coIIllllon 
methodology of having the subject report responses on a confidence rat-
ing scale. The use of this method assumes the confidence ratings re-
flect the multiple criteria subjects must maintain on each trial. The 
frequency of responses for each confidence rating within each of the 
two response categories (e.g., "old" and "new" in a recognition task) 
are recorded, and the hit rates and false alarm rates are then calcu-
lated by moving the criteria along the divisions between these multiple 
ratings. The confidence rating technique allowed great economy in the 
generation of ROC curves as the ROC curve could now be obtained after 
a single experiment. The resulting ROC curves were smoothly arched, 
supporting signal detection theory (Bernbach, 1967; Donaldson & Murdock, 
1968; Murdock, 1965; Swets et al., 1961). 
This procedure has been generalized so that it can be employed with 
animal as well as human subjects. In such instances the confidence 
ratings are operationally defined by response latencies (Hack, 1963, 
1966). Experiments with human subjects in which dependent measures of 
both confidence ratings and response latency were made have also 
empirically demonstrated this relationship (Murdock, 1968; Norman & 
Wickelgren, 1969). The extreme confidence ratings (e.g., very certain) 
were quick responses, while the less extreme confidence ratings had 
longer response latencies. 
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In experiments with human observers latency measures have generally 
been supplementary to confidence ratings, and it has often been con-
sidered that they convey similar information. Both confidence and 
response speed are assumed to be inverted U-shaped functions of response 
strength, the longest latencies and lowest confidence ratings being 
near the criterion. Norman and Wickelgren (1969, p. 195) state "response 
latency is related to trace strength in exactly the same way that con-
fidence judgements are related to trace strength." The basic theoretical 
interpretation is that very strong or very week observational values, 
being distant from the criterion, are easy to respond to quickly, and 
the subjects will be most certain of these responses. But observational 
values near the criterion are more difficult to discriminate, and there-
fore receive lower confidence ratings (Murdock, 1974). Studies done 
with infrahumans using response latency also substantiate signal detec-
tion theory assumptions by their resultant ROC curves (Hack, 1963, 1966; 
Hume, 1974; Yager & Duncan, 1971). 
The implications of the confidence rating method go beyond simple 
verification of the assumptions of equal variance and normal distribu-
tions. Confidence ratings demonstrate that subjects can maintain 
multiple subjective decision criteria. Subjects can evaluate and com~ 
pare their single observation against other subjective observations and 
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determine within which confidence range the observation falls. Subjects 
can accurately rate their confidence of an observation. In a recall 
memory paradigm using confidence ratings, Murdock reports that subjects 
"give highest ratings when they are nearly always correct, when they 
give lowest judgements they are nearly always wrong, and intermediate 
judgements are ordered accordingly" (Murdock, 1966, p. 320). Confidence 
ratings and response latencies demonstrate the complexity and accuracy 
of processing information concerned with man's awareness of observa-
tional information. 
A second type of confidence rating can be given, which suggests an 
even more cognitive level of information processing in the individual. 
This deals with the process earlier referred to as 11awareness of aware-
ness". Rather than give a confidence rating of his certainty of the 
observation (the stimulus), the subject gives a confidence rating based 
on his judgement of the correctness of his own response. This measure 
has been labeled Type II d' (Clarke, Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959). 
Type II d 1 differs from Type I d 1 in several respects (Clarke, 
Birdsall, & Tanner, 1959; Healey & Jones, 1973; Murdock, 1974). The 
major distinction is· that Type Id' is stimulus conditional; what is 
given by the subject is a rating based on his confidence of the presence 
or absence of the stimulus signal. The ~ priori probability of the 
signal is determined by the experimenter. The confidence rating is an 
expanded response which generates several points (as opposed to just 
one point generated by a Yes-No response) to be plotted on the ROC 
curve. 
In contrast to Type I d 1 , Type II d 1 is a response conditional 
discrimination. Whereas in Type I d 1 the distributions between which 
the subject must decide represent noise and signal-plus-noise, in Type 
II d' the two distributions represent incorrect and correct responses. 
"Type II is more complicated as it deals with the receiver's rating of 
confidence in his identification response" (Clarke et al., 1959, p. 
629). Type II d' confidence ratings are ratings of the subject's con-
fidence in the correctness of the response, and are given after the 
first response or decision is made. "The subject first gives a forced 
response . . • then evaluates this response by giving a confidence 
judgement to indicate how sure he is that this response is correct" 
(Murdock, 1974, p. 118). 
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Type II d' appears to be a second-order mode of behavior, cor-
responding to "awareness of awareness", in which the observer's con-
scious experience is evaluated. The fascinating aspect of this research 
is that subjects can accurately evaluate their own responses. In short, 
they know when they are right and know when they are wrong. Positive 
values of Type II d' have been empirically demonstrated in a variety of 
studies (Bernbach, 1967, 1971; Donaldson & Glathe, 1970; Murdock, 1966). 
Throughout trials subjects gave accurate evaluations of the correctness 
or incorrectness of their own responses. Such data attest to the com-
plexity of cognitive processing in man. Type II d' is a tool which may 
enable researchers to objectively grasp this type of information proc-
essing. 
Statement of the Problem 
One of the purposes of the present experiment was to investigate 
whether the data of human memory studies can be generalized to infra-
humans. The present experiment measured Type I d' and Type II d' of 
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rats using response latencies before and after a two-choice decision. 
The decision-making processes and discriminative abilities of rats 
have been studied under a wide variety of circumstances. It has been 
shown that signal detection analysis can be applied to the decision 
behavior of rats (Blough, 1967; Hack, 1963, 166; Hume, 1974). In the 
present study, Type I d' was computed from the rats' pre-decisional 
running latencies and Type II d' was computed from post-decisional 
running latencies. If Type II d' data from human subjects will gen-
eralize to rats, the rat's running speed should be faster after correct 
responses than after incorrect responses. 
The methodology and design can be viewed as a learning or memory 
paradigm in which the correct and incorrect responses represent the 
two overlapping distributions of signal detection analysis. The present 
attempt to relate post-discrimination latencies to correct and incorrect 
responses should not be confused with earlier attempts to measure Type I 
processing in animals, although pre-decisional latencies, yielding a 
measure of Type I d' were also recorded. Type II d' is thought to 
measure the evaluative or response editing processes of cognitive func-
tions such as memory, learning, and perception. These areas are them-
selves interrelated on methodological grounds; for this reason the more 
inclusive term of awareness has been used. 
In a broader sense, the present investigation is a comparative 
study that raises speculation as to the commonality of such information 
processing between species. The traditional Thorndikian approach pe 
presumes that the behavioral differences between species are only of a 
quantitative nature. More recent comparative analyses suggest that 
"suspicion has lingered that there are qualitative differences as 
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well ..• 'qualitative' in the sense that phenomena of learning char-
acteristic to some animals fail entirely to occur in others" (Bitterman, 
1975, p. 700). 
The present experiment examines running latency prior to and fol-
lowing a two-alternative forced-choice discrimination is a modified 
T-maze. Resultant d' values were obtained from the recorded latencies 
and the correctness of direction choice. A Type Id' significantly 
different from zero would replicate previous findings in the animal 
psychophysical literature (Blough, 1967; Hack, 1966; Hume, 1976), while 
findings of Type II values significantly different from zero would sup-
port the idea that Type II processes can be generalized to other species 




The design of the present experiment was a successive conditional 
discrimination (Mackintosh, 1974). The discriminative stimulus was a 
light at the decision point in the maze. For example, when the light 
was on the correct response was to turn right; when the light was off 
the correct response was to turn left. The correct direction for the 
presence or absence of the discriminative stimulus was counterbalanced 
across subjects, and the discriminative stimulus' absence or presence 
(light on or off) was randomized across trials. 
On each trial, the direction of the subject's choice, either cor-
rect or incorrect, as well as the pre-decisional and post-decisional 
latencies were recorded. The pre-decisional latency was defined as 
the time from when the subject entered the choice point area until it 
passed the decision point; the post-decisional latency was defined as 
the time from when the subject passed the decision point until the sub-
ject reached a goal box. 
Subjects 
The subjects were four adult female hooded rats. All subjects 
were experimentally naive and approximately 150 days old at the time of 
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testing. They were adapted to handling and were individually housed in 
plastic cages. Subjects were food deprived for 48 hours prior to Session 
One, and were maintained on a restricted diet of approximately 12 grams 
of Purina Laboratory Chow per day following each session. Water was 
available ad libitum throughout the experiment. A diurnal cycle of 
approximately 10 hours dark - 14 hours light was maintained in the 
animal colony room. 
Procedure 
Several shaping trials, in which food was placed in the food cups 
of both goal boxes, were used to familiarize the subjects with the 
apparatus. For each trial during the experiment the discriminative 
stimulus (the light) was turned on or off with a probability of .5 on 
each trial according to a random pattern, two food pellets (Noyes Preci-
sion Food Pellet, 4.5 mg) was placed in the correct goal box, and the 
subject was placed in the start box. After reaching a goal box the sub-
ject was removed from the maze and returned to its home cage, and the 
latencies and response direction were recorded. The four subjects were 
given each trial sequentially (i.e, Trial 1, Subject l; Trial l; Subject 
2; Trial 1, Subject 3; Trial 1, Subject 4; Trial 2, Subject 1, ••• ) 
generating a mean intertrial interval for each subject of approximately 
five minutes. This procedure continued until the subject reached a 
criterion of ten successive correct trials. 
A ceiling of 60 seconds for the pre-decisional and post-decisional 
latencies, as well as for the animal to leave the start box, was im-
posed. Subjects exceeding this value were returned to their home cage 
and it was considered as one trial for the subject although no data was 
recorded for that trial. Water was available at all times in the home 
cage during the intertrial interval and the room was dimly illuminated 
during all sessions. 
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Due to the observation that subjects were demonstrating a strong 
position preference, a rerun correction procedure was introduced for 
incorrect responses from Trial 125 - Trial 185. Under this procedure 
each subject was returned to the start box following an incorrect deci-
sion until a correct choice was made. 
Apparatus 
The maze used was a wooden modified T maze (Figure 2). The runway 
measured 3 feet (.9144 meters) from the start box to the choice point, 
and each arm had a total cununulative length of 5 feet (1.524 meters). 
A 15-watt light bulb and socket were mounted to the maze at the choice 
point. The maze alleys were 4 inches (10.16 cm.) wide, with at least 
4 inch (10.16 cm.) high walls throughout. After the choice point the 
two alleys were made discriminable by the presence of .75 inch (1.90 
mm.) white textured rubber strips in the left alley. With the exception 
of the white food cups in each goal box and the white textured strips 
in the left alley, the entire maze was painted flat black. Three sets 
of Lafayette Photoelectric Cells, Model PC-45, were connected to relays 
to two Hunter Klockcounters, callibrated to thousandths of a second, 
were used to record pre-decisional and post-decisional running latencies. 
4' 
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Each of the four subjects was able to learn the discrimination to 
the criterion of ten correct successive trials of correct responses. A 
mean of 175.2 trials (a = 24.8) was required to reach the criterion 
excluding rerun correction trials and including the ten criterion trials. 
Subject 4 reached criterion during Session 7; Subjects 1, 2, and 3 
reached criterion during Session 10. The rate of learning was somewhat 
erratic as shown by the acquisition data in Figure 3. 
Performance was particularly close to the chance level of 50% dur-
ing the middle sessions. This was due to the position habits subjects 
developed, commonly observed in discrimination learning. By always 
choosing to ~un to one arm of the apparatus, animals were effective 
on a Variable Ratio-2 Schedule of Reinforcement. Responding was main-
tained by the fact that animals were reinforced for this response on the 
average of every other trial. This strategy of always running in the 
same direction is presumably less difficult for the animal than the 
successive conditional discrimination. The correction rerun trials, in 
which the animal was given as many subsequent trials as necessary to 
make the correct response of choosing the opposite arm of the maze and 
obtaining the reinforcement, were successful in extinguishing these 
















• • Sµbject 1 Subject 3 ___ _. 







,,...,,... I \ '\.. I 
,.__(' I '\. I 
{ I \ " I 
/ I \ b-- II 
I _/ \ --~ 
!,,, ,/" \ 







4~~-------~ ........ ~~_..,l.~--~ ..... ~~~~~-i..~~--o1----..~..+-~~---4-~~~~-
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 . ? 9-- 10 
Session 





the preferred but incorrect side was reduced to zero. 
On many trials, particularly during the first few sessions but to 
a larger extent throughout the entire experiment, data was lost due to 
rats reaching the imposed 60 second ceiling or attempting to climb out 
of the maze or onto the photoelectric cells. 
In analyzing the data to obtain values of d' for pre-decisional and 
post-decisional latencies it is desirable to eliminate prelearning, 
chance performance in order not to overshadow any differences after the 
animal has begun to learn the discrimination. Due to the great variabil-
ity in the learning curves (Figure 3), the last 20 trials of each sub-
ject prior to reaching the learning criterion were used as data points 
in the signal detection analysis. This number of trials was selected 
as being a reasonable sample size from which to estimate values of d'. 
The last 20 trials were selected as it is the data immediately prior to 
criterion which should be most sensitive to differences, if any, which 
exist between correct and incorrect latencies. These data have the 
additional advantage of having complete data for almost all of these 
trials as the above-mentioned problems resulting in loss of data were 
very infrequent by this point in the experiment. 
The pre-decisional latencies for the last 20 trials prior to 
criterion for all four subjects (a total of 55 correct and 25 incorrect 
responses) were combined for analysis as no significant differences were 
found between subjects, !_ (3,76) = .88, .E_ > .25. The pre-decisional 
latencies were grouped into decile categories (cf. Yager & Duncan, 
1971) and then divided into correct and incorrect responses within each 
decile category. The frequency, cumulative frequency, and proportions 
of responses within each of these divisions is shown in Table I. The 
I 
TABLE I 
PRE-DECISIONAL LATENCY CATEGORIES, CONDITIONALIZED UPON CORRECT AND INCORRECT 
RESPONSES FOR THE LAST 20 TRIALS FOR ALL SUBJECTS PRIOR TO CRITERIA 
Latency in Milliseconds < 300 < 350 < 400 < 450 < 500 <550 < 600 < 650 < 700 
Cumulative Correct 1 20 33 39 45 47 50 50 51 
Frequency Incorrect 1 3 7 12 15 19 20 23 23 
Cumulative Correct .018 .364 .600 .709 .818 .854 .909 .909 . 927 
Proportion Incorrect .040 .120 .280 .480 .600 .760 .800 .920 .920 
Cumulative Correct 1.8 36.4 60.0 70.9 81.8 85.4 90.9 90.9 92.7 










resultant ROC curve from these data is shown on linear coordinates in 
Figure 4 and on normal deviate (z-score) coordinates in Figure 5. 
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As predicted by signal detection theory, the ROC curve on linear 
coordinates is smoothly arched, although the obtained curve is not 
symmetrical. On normal deviate coordinates, the ROC curve approximates 
a linear function. The value of d' was obtained from this graph by 
multiplying f2 by the distance along the minor diagonal between the 
origin of the normal deviate· graph (zero detectability) and the ROC 
function according to the graphical method of signal detection theory 
(Simpson & Fitter, 1973). For the pre-decisional latency data, d' is 
equal to .65. This value of d' is significantly greater than zero as 
compared by the G-test (Gourevitch & Galanter, 1967), Q. = 2.09, 
.E.. < .04. For the last 20 trials prior to reaching criteria subjects' 
pre-decisional latencies reflected a discrimination between correct and 
incorrect choices. Fast pre-decisional choice times were associated 
with correct responses. 
Post-decisional response latencies of the last 20 trials for each 
subject were also analyzed using the graphical method of signal detec-
tion theory. Latencies were combined over subjects for analysis as no 
significant differences between subjects were present, !_ (3,76) = 1.08, 
.E.. > .25. The decile categories for post-decisional latencies, condi-
tionalized upon correct and incorrect responses, are given in Table II. 
The untransformed response probabilities are graphed on linear coor-
dinates in Figure 6 and the same data is plotted in terms of normal z-
scores in Figure 7. As can be clearly seen from the graphs, the Type 
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Figure 5. ROC Curve for Pre-Decisional 
Latencies 
TABLE II 
POST-DECISIONAL LATENCY CATEGORIES, CONDITIONALIZED UPON CORRECT AND INCORRECT 
RESPONSES FOR THE LAST 20 TRIALS FOR ALL SUBJECTS PRIOR TO CRITERIA 
Latency in Seconds < 1. 7 < 1.8 < 1.9 < 2.0 < 2.1 < 2.2 < 2.3 < 2.4 
Cumulative Correct 1 6 15 22 31 33 37 42 
Frequency Incorrect 0 1 8 11 13 13 19 20 
Cumulative Correct .018 . 017 .268 .393 .554 .589 .661 .750 
Proportion Incorrect .000 .042 .333 .458 .542 .542 .792 .833 
Cumulative Correct 1.8 10. 7 26.8 39.3 55.4 58.9 66.1 75.0 
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Figure 7. ROC Curve for Post-Decisional 
Latencies 
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.E. > .50. This finding of a nonsignificant Type II d' indicates that the 
post-decisional response latencies f ~iled to discriminate between correct 
and incorrect responses. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The pre-decisional running latencies of subjects in the present 
study, when analyzed according to the graphical method of signal de-
tection theory, displayed ad' value significantly greater than zero. 
This finding is congruent with previous animal physiophysical research 
employing response latency (Hack, 1966; Yager & Duncan, 1971) or 
response frequency (Blough, 1967) as the dependent variable in a mul-
tiple criterion paradigm. It should be noted that in the present 
design pre-decisional latencies were recorded from when the rat entered 
the choice area, that is, after the subject had already begun to re-
spond, until it passed the choice point. As the discriminative stimulus 
was presumably visible from the start box, the recorded pre-decisional 
latency is in fact only the latter part of the total pre-decisional 
latency. The significant effect of the pre-decisional choice times may 
have even been more robust if the total pre-decisional latencies had 
been recorded. 
The significant value of d' for the pre-decisional running latencies 
indicates that these latencies reflect a discrimination between correct 
and incorrect choices, with subjects generally deciding faster on trials 
when they made correct responses. Such a discrimination implies that 
animals are able to edit their responses to choice situations, in this· 
27 
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case in terms of running latency, in a manner analogous to human memory 
confidence rating responses. There appears to be a memorial process 
occurring prior to the choice by which the subjects' pre-decisional 
response accurately reflects the probability of making a correct or in-
correct decision. 
The ROC or isosensitivity curves shown in Figures 5 and 6 for pre-
decisional choice times differ from idealized functions as they are not 
symmetrical and have a non-unity slope. Within the present context, 
this could be interpreted as slower pre-decisional latencies providing 
less information concerning the discrimination between correct and in-
correct responses as compared with the more rapid response latencies. 
However, this result of a non-unity slope is not typical of empirically 
obtained ROC curves with human (see Tulving & Madigan, 1970) or animal 
subjects (Blough, 1967). It has been hypothesized that this prevalent 
finding of ROC curves with slopes less than one may result from the 
underlying variables being other than normally distributed. 
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate Type II d' 
as measured by the post-decisional response latencies. The obtained 
Type II d' did not significantly differ from zero, the chance detect-
ability of d'. Rats' running latencies from after a decision was made 
until they reached the goal box did not reflect a discrimination between 
correct and incorrect choices. 
This apparent lack of editing of responses by subjects in this 
particular task certainly does not prove that editing of post-deci-
sional responses in animals does not occur. In this case, as always, 
a finding of no significant difference has two viable explanations: 
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(1) there is, in fact, no significant difference in the value of d' for 
post-decisional running latencies suggesting that response editing does 
not occur in this phase of the response; or (2) the present measure was 
insensitive to any differences that may have been present. The present 
measure, that of running latency as the dependent variable, does appear 
appropriate based on the pre-decisional latency results and the assump-
tion that such response editing processes would manifest themselves in 
the same behavior; an assumption which appears to be justified at least 
in terms of human memory data measuring Type II d'. 
A less cognitive interpretation of the post-decisional latency 
results can be found within traditional stimulus-response learning 
theories. It has often been postulated that running latencies them-
selves can be considered part of the learned response. Thus, if an 
animal runs fast and is frequently reinforced it may continue to run 
fast independently of whether the response was correct or incorrect. 
Although this interpretation could possibly serve as an explanatory 
mechanism for the lack of difference between correct and incorrect post-
decisional latencies, it is contrary to the result of a significant d' 
value in the pre-decisional latencies. This apparent discrepancy can 
be resolved by assuming, at least in the present task, that the proc-
esses controlling behavior before a decision is made are different from 
those controlling behavior after a decision is made. Prior to the 
choice point, the animal runs quickly when it is relatively certain of 
the correctness of its response, and more slowly as it is less certain. 
Thus, subjects are reinforced more often for running quickly than for 
running slowly. This is shown empirically in Table I. Perhaps the 
animal, realizing that the decision has been made, runs quickly as 
running quickly has been reinforced more frequently. The reason why 
this does not occur in experiments using human subjects may be due to 
the very different motivational factors involved. 
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This mechanistic explanation does not allow for manifestations of 
"awareness of awareness" and is certainly inconsistent with human memory 
data. Rather than reflecting differences in cognitive processing between 
humans and infrahuman species, the results may be better understood by 
examining the differences between the experimental tasks in which Type 
II d' values are obtained in humans and the task in the present exper-
iment. In human studies, subjects are typically asked to make a 
response, and then to rate their confidence in their response, usually 
along some given scale. The actual response is clearly dissociated from 
the subsequent confidence rating which is a totally different type of 
response. In the present experiment, the pre-decisional and post-
decisional running latencies do not appear as distinct responses, but 
rather as different parts of the same response. The results of a 
significant d' value for the pre-decisional phase, but a nonsignificant 
value for the post-decisional phase may be accounted for in terms of 
the paradigm used. A more appropriate design for use in animal psycho-
physical research concerning Type II d' might involve two distinct 
responses, for example, running through the choice point and then hav-
ing animals bar press in the goal box for the reinforcement, with the 
rate of bar pressing being used as the dependent variable for obtaining 
values of Type II d'. 
These latter suggestions lean more toward the interpretation of no 
significant difference as being the result of the parameters utilized 
rather than as a result of radical differences in cognitive processes 
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between humans and other animals. As previously mentioned, the data 
could be interpreted as providing support for either of these two 
possibilities. It does, however, seen parsimonious to hypothesize that 
the underlying processes of Type II d' are present in other species 
besides man. Type II d 1 is a type of "second order" retrieval process, 
and other aspects of retrieval have been shown to be similar between 
man and other species. It certainly appears adaptative for animals, as 
well as man, to be able to behave differentially to situations as a 
function of the confidence in their response. 
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